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Abstract:  
Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction (PNC) has been interpreted by Łukasiewicz through 
three distinct formulations, namely ontological, logical, and psychological. Many have 
criticized Łukasiewicz’s position, but they still maintain that Aristotle defends distinct 
formulations. In contrast, this paper shows that Aristotle suggests only one formulation of the 
PNC. This unique formulation belongs to philosophy as the first science, so that the 
philosophers think of the PNC as a necessarily true principle, owing to their meta-physical 
cognition of the nature of things. Yet, there is another way to understand this formulation. 
Indeed, the non-philosophers believe in the PNC, without being able to understand its necessary 
truth, due to their ignorance of philosophy. Thus, Aristotle has to convince them that the PNC is 
the most certain opinion of all, and his dialectical justifications are purposely weak, as they are 
only concerned with the defense of a common opinion. 
 
 
 
In Chapter 3 of Metaphysics Gamma, Aristotle introduces the so-called principle of 
non-contradiction (hereafter PNC).1 It is important to put this principle into context in 
order to understand why and how Aristotle introduces it: 
It is proper for the one who best cognizes (gnôrizonta) each genus to be able to state the most 
certain principles (archas) of an actual thing, so that the one who cognizes beings, qua beings 
(tôn ontôn hêi onta), will also be able to state the most certain principles of all things. This is the 
philosopher. The most certain principle of all is about which it is impossible to be mistaken; for 
this most cognized principle has to be necessary (for everyone is deceived by things which they 
do not cognize) and not hypothetical. For it is necessary for the principle dealing with anything 
about beings not to be a hypothesis; and it is necessary for the one who cognizes anything about 
beings to cognize it, and it is necessary to have it present. Hence, it is clear that this principle is 
the most certain of all; and what this principle is, we can say it after all this. For it is impossible 
for the same thing to belong and not to belong simultaneously (hama huparchein kai mê 
huparchein) to the same thing and in the same respect (kata to auto) (and regarding all the other 
specifications that might be added, they have to be added against the dialectical difficulties 
(pros tas logikas duschereias)). (Metaphysics Gamma, 3, 1005b8-22)2 
 
The PNC has been called metaphysical or ontological, as it pertains to the universal 
nature of things. This principle asserts that it is impossible for the same thing to belong 
                                                 
1
 We shall use the acronym PNC as a useful convention, but the expression ‘principle of 
non-contradiction’ (for which PNC stands) is nowhere to be found in Aristotle’s works. 
2
 All translations in this paper are my own, unless otherwise indicated. The two main English 
translations of Metaphysics Gamma are Ross (1924) and Kirwan (1993). 
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and not to belong to the same thing, both simultaneously and in the same respect. 
That is, if A is predicated of B, it is impossible for A not to be predicated of B, if these 
two opposite predications are both simultaneous and in the same respect. The condition 
of simultaneity (hama) excludes a changing predicate, in which A at time t1 has changed 
into something else at time t2.3 The second condition is that the opposite predications 
must be in the same respect (kata ta auto), namely the predicate A and its denied 
predicate must be contradictories, and not just contraries. If this condition does not hold, 
contradiction cannot apply. For instance, if tall is predicated of a thing, it is still possible 
for tall not to be predicated of this same thing. Indeed, a tall thing can be regarded as not 
being tall towards a taller thing. The predicate and its denied predicate are simultaneous, 
but not in the same respect: while the thing is tall with respect to itself (e.g. a tall dog), 
it is not tall with respect to something taller (e.g. an elephant). In this case, the 
predication and its denial are contraries, but not contradictories. This means that, for a 
true (false) predication, its contrary may also be true (false), as opposed to its 
contradictory that will always be false (true).4 
According to the above passage, the PNC is a principle, whose necessity implies 
that it cannot be otherwise. It is, therefore, not a hypothesis. It is said to be the most 
certain principle of all, as it cannot be mistaken. Yet, these claims must not be 
investigated out of context. Aristotle assesses the PNC in relation to the philosophers, 
namely the ones who investigate philosophy as a first science. The PNC is a necessary 
principle only for those who know about “beings, qua beings”. In other words, the 
ignorance of the first science prevents one from cognizing (gnôrizonta) the PNC, so that 
the cognition (gnôsis) of this principle is accessible only to the philosophers. If we lose 
sight of philosophy as a first science, we cannot understand its relation to physics as a 
second science, and we cannot then grasp the relevance of Aristotle’s discussion with 
the physicists in his defense of the PNC. Metaphysics Gamma makes us aware that 
philosophy (as meta-physics) is the only science able to account for the necessary 
principles of knowledge (epistêmê), which are beyond knowledge itself. This book 
starts with the claim that all particular sciences require a universal science about beings, 
                                                 
3
 These times t1 and t2 are indivisible instants of time, distinct from the divisible intervals of 
time through which (continuous) change takes place (cf. Hudry 2009). 
4
 See chapter 10 of De Interpretatione regarding the distinction between the contrary (enantia) 
and the contradictory (antikeimenê). 
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qua beings, and the aim of this universal science is to provide the highest explanations 
about the nature of things. Here is the whole chapter 1 of Metaphysics Gamma: 
There is a science that studies being, qua being (to on hêi on), and what belongs in itself to this. 
This is not the same as the ones that we call particular sciences; for none of these other sciences 
universally deal with being, qua being, but they cut off some part of being and study the 
attribute about it, e.g. as the mathematical sciences do. Since we are searching for the principles, 
i.e. the highest explanations (aitias), clearly it is necessary for them to be from a nature in itself. 
If then those who searched for the components of beings also searched for these principles, it is 
also necessary that the components of being are not by accident but qua being; that is why we 
must also grasp the primary explanations of being, qua being. (Metaphysics Gamma, 1, 
1003a21-32) 
 
The highest explanations are neither mathematical nor physical, but philosophical. This 
science is universal, in so far as it investigates the nature of things by reference to a 
universal genus, which comprehends all the particular genera studied by the particular 
sciences. A thing is said to be geometric when studied by geometry, or physical when 
studied by physics, so that a geometric thing is distinct from a physical thing. On the 
other hand, a thing is said to be meta-physical (or ontological), when its universal nature 
goes beyond the scope of the particular sciences. The non-philosophers are unable to 
grasp philosophy in the same way that the non-mathematicians are ignorant of 
mathematics. While the physicists and the mathematicians have nothing to say about the 
universal genus of things, the philosophers must comprehend what physics and 
mathematics say about the particular genera of things. This is explained by the fact that 
philosophy, as a first science, includes both physics (as a second science) and 
mathematics (as a third science). It is in this context that the PNC has to be understood. 
Its cognition depends on philosophy alone, so that the non-philosophers express an 
opinion about it, without being able to cognize it. We cannot, therefore, separate the 
explanation of Aristotle’s PNC from the way this principle is either cognized or merely 
believed.  
The study of the PNC by the commentators have been heavily influenced by 
Łukasiewicz (1910/1979), who investigates the principle itself, independently of the 
textual context. He divides the PNC into three formulations, namely an ontological, a 
logical, and a psychological formulation. Unlike the majority of the commentators, we 
shall suggest that the PNC has a unique formulation. In other words, there are not 
different formulations, but only different ways to deal with a unique formulation. On the 
one hand, the philosophers assume the necessary truth of an indemonstrable principle. 
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On the other hand, the non-philosophers share only a common opinion, whose truth 
cannot be necessary. Everyone has the ability to believe in the PNC, but only the 
philosophers have the capacity to understand the universal nature of things upon which 
the PNC is based. There is only one PNC, namely a philosophical one, and we shall 
reject the other two formulations coined by Łukasiewicz’s reconstructed argument. It is 
clear that the primacy of philosophy, conceived of as a meta-physical science, could not 
be viewed as relevant by Łukasiewicz, namely a logician from the beginning of the 
twentieth century wanting to believe in the supremacy of mathematical logic. 
Nevertheless, we shall conclude that Aristotle’s position in Metaphysics Gamma makes 
perfect sense, in so far as he focuses on the different audiences to which the PNC is 
addressed, without modifying the PNC itself, which belongs to one and only one 
universal science. 
 
1. Łukasiewicz’s additional formulations 
 
Łukasiewicz’s (1910/1979) is the first commentator who distinguishes three 
formulations of Aristotle’s PNC: 
Aristotle formulates the Law of Contradiction in three ways, as an ontological, a logical, and a 
psychological law; he does not make explicit the differences between them. 
(a) Ontological formulation: ‘It is impossible that the same thing should both belong and not 
belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect’ (Meta. IV 3, 1005b19-20). 
(b) Logical formulation: ‘The most certain of all [principles] is that contradictory sentences are 
not true at the same time’ (Meta. IV 6, 1011b13-14). 
(c) Psychological formulation: ‘No-one can believe that the same thing can [at the same time] 
be and not be’ (Meta. IV 3, 1005b23-24). (1979, 50-1) 
 
If many commentators are eager to criticize Łukasiewicz’s interpretation, they still talk 
about logical and psychological formulations, as if such formulations were distinct from 
the ontological one.5 In fact, the strength of Łukasiewicz’s argument is illustrated by his 
claim that Aristotle “does not make explicit the differences between them” (cf. above). 
                                                 
5
 Wians (2006, 336, footnote 12) asserts: “It is widely recognized that Aristotle states the PNC 
in several quite different formulations (see, e.g., Kirwan 1993, 88-89; Lukasiewicz 
1910/1979)”. Likewise, Barnes (1969), Dancy (1975), Upton (1983), Code (1986), 
Cohen (1986), McKirahan (1992), Gottlieb (1994), Whitaker (1996), Politis (2004) and 
Wedin (2004ab) follow these additional formulations, despite different terminologies (e.g. 
Barnes underlines the psychological formulation with a “Law of Thought”, whereas Gottlieb 
speaks of “doxastic” and “semantic” formulations). 
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This gives him freedom to reconstruct the argument, without paying too much attention 
to the intrinsic difficulties of Aristotle’s text. Indeed, his aim is to stress a logical 
reconstruction of Aristotle’s PNC, beyond metaphysics and psychology. In that respect, 
Łukasiewicz (1920/1957) is influenced by Frege’s conception of logic as formal 
ontology, when he identifies Aristotle’s syllogistic logic with a system of universalized, 
conditional propositions, understood as a formal ontology of logical truths. With respect 
to the PNC, he suggests a logical formulation, based on the one-one correlations 
between (logical) sentences and (ontological) states of affairs. He then concludes to the 
equivalence of the logical and the ontological formulations.6 Łukasiewicz also notices 
that the logical formulation does not have a proper logical foundation: “the Law of 
Contradiction has no logical value, since it only has the status of an assumption” (1979, 
62, original emphasis). Nonetheless, he forgets to say that, if the logical formulation is a 
mere assumption, it is due to his own postulate that the ontological and logical 
formulations are equivalent. Since this equivalence is nowhere stated in Metaphysics 
Gamma, we may conclude that Łukasiewicz’s objection is confined to his own 
reconstruction of Aristotle’s position. Unless we think of Aristotle as a modern logician, 
like Frege or Russell, it is unsurprising to observe that the PNC has no logical 
foundation. It is even reassuring, since it underlines the well-known fact that 
Aristotelian logic is distinct from modern logic, as it does not imply a formal separation 
between syntax and semantics.7  
Łukasiewicz also accuses Aristotle of “logicism in psychology”, in so far as the 
logical formulation of the PNC seems to justify the psychological formulation: 
Aristotle attempts to prove the psychological Law of Contradiction on the basis of the logical 
Law… Precisely formulated, Aristotle’s proof of the psychological Law of Contradiction runs 
as follows: If two beliefs answering to contradictory sentences could exist at the same time in a 
single consciousness, then contrary properties would hold of that consciousness at the same 
time. But by the logical Law of Contradiction it is impossible for contrary properties to hold of 
a single object at the same time. Hence two beliefs answering to contradictory sentences cannot 
exist in a single consciousness at the same time. Aristotle’s proof of the psychological Law of 
                                                 
6
 Łukasiewicz (1910) writes: “Aristotle thinks that the logical and ontological formulations are 
logically equivalent; for he treats sentences as representations of objectives [states of affairs], 
with which he puts them in a one-one correlation… This one-one correlation between sentences 
and objectives entails the equivalence of the ontological and the logical Laws of 
Contradictions.” (1979, 52; original emphasis). 
7
 See Hudry (2011) defending a mental conception of meaning in Aristotle by not applying the 
modern divide between syntax and semantics. 
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Contradiction is inadequate because he has not proved that beliefs answering to contradictory 
sentences are contraries… Aristotle falls into the common error of ‘logicism in psychology’—
the converse of ‘psychologism in logic’. Instead of investigating mental facts, Aristotle 
considers the sentences answering to such facts, and the logical relations holding between such 
sentences. (1979, 52, 53, original emphases) 
 
Following Łukasiewicz’s reconstruction, Aristotle reduces the psychological 
formulation to the logical formulation, itself equivalent to the ontological formulation. 
Łukasiewicz writes (cf. above): “by the logical Law of Contradiction it is impossible for 
contrary properties to hold of a single object at the same time”. He speaks of “logicism 
in psychology” because, according to him, Aristotle fails to provide a psychological 
formulation exclusively relying on opinions (i.e. independently of sentences). Once 
again, his criticism holds only if we agree with his initial postulate that there is a 
psychological formulation of the PNC, which has to be distinct from the logical 
formulation. Yet, Aristotle cannot make such a distinction, because sentences for him 
are nothing more than the verbal expressions of opinions in spoken language, so that 
what applies to sentences also applies to opinions. Thus, the truth or falsehood of 
sentences is not different from the truth or falsehood of opinions.8  
Consequently, Aristotle and Łukasiewicz do not share the same postulates about the 
PNC. While Łukasiewicz assumes three distinct formulations, Aristotle makes only one 
formulation in relation to philosophy, such that the PNC is a necessary principle 
belonging to the first science. The formulation is the same for all, so that what is 
changing is only the way in which the audience understands it. While the philosophers 
define a scientific principle, the non-philosophers only express an opinion about this 
principle. 
 
2. Ignorance of philosophy 
 
                                                 
8
 The Categories (5, 4a23-28, 4a34-b1) asserts: “For the same sentence (logos) seems to be both 
true and false, for instance, if the sentence that someone is sitting is true, the same sentence will 
be false when this person will get up; and likewise for the opinion (doxês); for if we have the 
true opinion that someone is sitting, when this person gets up, and if we hold the same opinion, 
we will have a false opinion… Sentence and opinion remain completely unchanged in every 
way, and because of a change of the actual thing (pragmatos) the contrary comes to pertain to 
them; for the sentence that someone is sitting remains the same, and because of a change of the 
actual thing it comes to be true at one time and false at another; and likewise for the opinion.”  
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For the ones who ignore philosophy, the PNC is nothing more than a common opinion. 
Aristotle’s main audience in Metaphysics Gamma is the non-philosopher, who is both 
the scientist (such as the physicist or the mathematician) and the non-scientist (such as 
the dialectician or the sophist). Aristotle has to convince them that the PNC, being the 
most certain principle of all, is the most certain opinion of all. Everyone must believe in 
the PNC, meaning that every scientist, who produces some demonstrative knowledge 
from the particular sciences, must hold the PNC as the ultimate opinion:  
This is plainly the most certain of all principles; for it has the aforesaid characteristic. For it is 
impossible for anyone to believe that a same thing is and is not, as said by Heraclitus according 
to some. For it is not necessary to agree with what has been said [by Heraclitus]; if it is not 
possible for opposites to belong to the same thing simultaneously (and let us also add the usual 
specifications to this premise), and if an opinion is the opposite of an opinion as a contradiction, 
it is evident that it is impossible for the same person to believe that the same thing is and is not 
simultaneously; for the one who would be deceived on this point would have opposite opinions 
simultaneously. That is why all those who use demonstrations refer to this as an ultimate 
opinion (eschatên doxan); for this is also by nature the principle of all the other axioms. 
(Metaphysics Gamma, 3, 1005b22-34) 
 
The ultimate opinion consists in believing that the PNC is a meta-physical principle, 
from which all demonstrative knowledge is made possible. This true opinion is justified 
by the fact that a person is not different from a thing. Since it is impossible for a same 
thing to have contradictory predicates, it is also impossible for a same person to hold 
contradictory opinions. The impossibility of having contradictory opinions justifies the 
ultimate opinion about the PNC. This is a way for the non-philosophers to be convinced 
by the PNC, in so far as their ignorance of the first science prevents them from 
cognizing the universal nature of things, upon which the PNC is based. In that respect, 
they are only able to believe in the PNC, without going into the investigation of this 
meta-physical principle. While the philosophers assert the necessary truth of this 
principle, the non-philosophers only assess the accidental truth of an opinion. This 
distinction can be illustrated as follows. We believe that modern sciences are true, even 
though only the scientists properly know the scientific principles, so that that they are 
able to explain to us why we are right to hold such true opinions about these modern 
sciences. For instance, a physicist is able to justify the Newtonian principle of 
gravitation as proper science, unlike a non-physicist, who only believes in its truth 
through a mere opinion. This does not mean that there is a psychological formulation of 
this principle, distinct from the physical formulation. Likewise, Aristotle does not 
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suggest a psychological formulation of the PNC, different from the meta-physical 
formulation. There is only one PNC, the one established by philosophy, and Aristotle 
wants to make sure that the non-philosophers have a true opinion about this scientific 
principle.  
As long as philosophy is not investigated as the first science, i.e. as a universal 
science with respect to all particular sciences, the PNC cannot be defined as a 
meta-physical principle, i.e. as the most certain of all scientific principles. Thus, when 
Metaphysics Beta deals with the PNC, independently of the science to which it belongs, 
Aristotle merely speaks of it as a common opinion.9 All principles of demonstrations are 
viewed as “common opinions” (koinai doxai), since the science to which they belong is 
not yet identified. In Metaphysics Beta, Aristotle does not even know whether these 
common opinions pertain to one or several sciences (and this question will receive a 
definite answer only in Metaphysics Gamma): 
But also it is debatable whether there is one science or more about the principles of 
demonstrations (I mean by the principles of demonstrations the common opinions (koinas 
doxas) from which everyone makes a proof), e.g. that it is necessary for everything to be either 
affirmed or denied, that it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be simultaneously, and all 
other premises of this kind, the question being whether there is only one science of these 
premises and of substance, or a different one, and if there is not one science, which of the two 
needs to be identified with that which we now seek. (Metaphysics Beta, 2, 996b26-33)10 
The principles of demonstrations are common opinions for the ones who make proofs, 
meaning that the scientists, using demonstrations in their investigation of a particular 
science, admit indemonstrable principles. Aristotle’s two instances of common opinion 
are the PNC (i.e. “it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be simultaneously”) and 
                                                 
9
 Ross (1924) prefers to translate koine doxa as ‘common belief’ instead of ‘common opinion’, 
as the term ‘belief’ seems to account for something more stable than ‘opinion’ (and this is partly 
due to the modern conception of knowledge understood as ‘justified true belief’). Yet, such a 
distinction has no textual basis in Aristotle, and this paper uses the term ‘opinion’, without 
implying a somewhat anachronistic distinction between opinion and belief.  
10
 Here is the other passage from Metaphysics Beta (2, 997a15-25) speaking about “common 
opinions”: “In general, is there one science or several ones about all substances? If there is not 
one, to which substance this science has to be assigned? On the other hand, it is not reasonable 
for one science to deal with all; for then one science would be demonstrative about all attributes, 
if indeed every demonstrative science about some underlying thing (hupokeimenon) studies its 
attributes in themselves from the common opinions (ek tôn koinôn doxôn). Hence, the study, for 
a same genus, of the attributes in themselves pertains to the same science from the same 
opinions. For there is one science about the genus, and one from the opinions, whether the 
science is the same or another, so that the attributes are also studied either by these sciences or 
by only one of these.” 
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the principle of the excluded middle (i.e. “it is necessary for everything to be either 
affirmed or denied”). These principles are merely assumed, without being cognized, as 
they do not belong to the same science as the demonstrated conclusions. In Metaphysics 
Gamma, Aristotle investigates these two common opinions by connecting them with 
philosophy as the first science (cf. chapters 3-6 for the PNC, and chapter 7 for the 
excluded middle). This universal science transforms these mere opinions into 
meta-physical principles, whose necessary truth provides some epistemic foundation to 
the demonstrative knowledge of each particular science. In other words, only the 
philosophers can explain why a particular science amounts to demonstrative knowledge, 
and why the PNC is an indemonstrable principle of demonstrative knowledge.  
Philosophy is a universal science, based on the universal genera of things, which are 
investigated through indemonstrable principles, as opposed to the particular genera of 
things, studied through the demonstrations of the particular sciences. Metaphysics 
Gamma analyzes the role of the philosopher with respect to the other kinds of scientist, 
namely the geometer and the physicist: 
We must say whether to deal with axioms, as called in mathematics, and with substance (ousias) 
pertains to one or two different sciences. It is evident that the inquiry into these axioms pertains 
to one science, i.e. the one of the philosopher; for these belong to all substances, and not to a 
particular genus separate from others. Everyone also uses them, because they are about being, 
qua being (tou ontos hêi on), and each genus is a being; but they use them just so far as they 
need them, i.e. as far as the genus from which they demonstrate extends; hence, since it is clear 
that the axioms belong to all genera, qua beings (for this is what is common to them), the study 
about them pertains to the one who cognizes (gnôriszontos) being, qua being. That is why 
anyone who is conducting a particular inquiry tries to say nothing about their truth or falsehood, 
i.e. neither the geometer nor the arithmetician, but some physicists have done it, quite 
unsurprisingly; for they thought to be the only ones to study the whole of nature, i.e. being. 
Since there is someone still further above the physicist (for nature is one particular genus of 
being), the inquiry into these axioms will pertain to the one who studies the universal, i.e. the 
primary substance (tên prôtên ousiam); physics is also some wisdom (sophia tis), but not 
primary. (Metaphysics Gamma, 3, 1005a19-b2) 
 
This passage explains how philosophy is a meta-physical science. First, Aristotle 
repeats the question asked in Metaphysics Beta, i.e. whether the principles (axioms) 
belong to either one (universal) science or several (particular) sciences. His reply is that 
the principles must be about a universal science, whose scope includes all substances. 
Philosophy is the universal science, as there is nothing prior to it, unlike physics that is 
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subsumed under philosophy.11 Therefore, anyone investigating the demonstrative 
knowledge of a particular science must assume some philosophical principles, but they 
do so only in so far as the particular genus, which they study, is concerned with them. 
For instance, the geometers presuppose the PNC only with respect to geometric 
magnitudes, namely things whose particular genus is continuity (since every magnitude 
is continuous by definition). Likewise, the arithmeticians postulate the PNC only with 
respect to numbers, namely things whose particular genus is plurality (since every 
number is plural by definition). As for the physicists, they admit the PNC only with 
respect to physical things, namely things whose particular genus is motion (since every 
physical thing is movable by definition). In contrast, the philosophers define the PNC 
with respect to all (composed) substances, namely things whose universal genus is 
being (since every composed substance exists by definition). In other words, the PNC, 
as a meta-physical principle, is connected with the what-being-is (to ti ên einai) for a 
thing (i.e. the primary substance for a composed substance). Metaphysics Zeta 
(cf. 11, 1037a21-b7) distinguishes the primary substance (prôte ousia) from the 
composed substance (sunolos ousia). While the primary substance is the form (eidos) of 
a particular thing, the composed substance is the particular thing itself, i.e. the 
compound of the form and the matter. Thus, the philosophers assert the necessary truth 
of the PNC by defining the primary substances (the universal genera) of all things. On 
the other hand, the physicists, the geometers, and the arithmeticians cannot assess the 
necessary truth of the PNC, since they disregard the universal genera of all things. They 
investigate only particular genera, whether it is of all movable things, of all geometric 
magnitudes, or of all numbers. 
Aristotle even criticizes the non-philosophers, who want to prove the truth of the 
PNC. He accuses them of ignoring analytics, as they do not know that the principles of 
demonstrations are indemonstrable premises. That is, the cognition (gnôsis) of an 
indemonstrable premise is not of the same kind as the knowledge (epistêmê) of a 
                                                 
11
 Metaphysics Epsilon (1, 1026a27-31) asserts: “If then there is no substance other than those 
formed by nature, physics will be the first science; but if there is some immovable substance, 
the science of this is prior, it is first philosophy, and is universal in this way, because it is first” 
(cf. also Metaphysics Kappa, 7, 1064b9-14). On the unity of science in Aristotle, see Ferejohn 
(1991). 
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deduced conclusion. Only the philosophers are able to investigate the principles of 
deductions, which lie outside the scope of all the particular sciences:  
All the attempts for some to state the way in which we must accept truth are due to their 
ignorance of analytics (di’ apaideusian tôn analutikôn); for they must understand this 
beforehand, and not to search for it while listening. Hence, it is clear that it falls to the 
philosopher, i.e. to the one who studies the whole of substance (ousias) according to its nature, 
to inquire into the principles of deductions (peri tôn sullogistikôn archôn). (Metaphysics 
Gamma, 3, 1005b2-8) 
 
Philosophy, as a meta-physical science, is prior to the demonstrative knowledge of all 
the particular sciences, meaning that the necessarily true principles expressed by 
philosophy cannot be proved through demonstrations. The Posterior Analytics (cf. A, 
12, 77a36-b15) confirms that the physicists and the mathematicians have to restrict their 
respective investigation to their own, particular science: “hence, we do not have to ask 
each scientist (epistêmona) every question, nor does he have to answer everything that 
he is asked about anything, but only those questions confined to his science 
(epistêmên)” (77b6-9). When the geometers prove that every triangle has angles equal 
to two right angles, it is sufficient for them to assume the truth of the PNC as a common 
opinion. On the other hand, when the philosophers investigate the substance of a 
triangle, they first have to cognize the PNC as a meta-physical principle. Indeed, there 
would be no possible cognition of the what-being-is (to ti ên einai) for a triangle, 
without the precognition of the PNC. When defined by a geometer, a triangle is nothing 
more than a geometric magnitude (quantity), but when defined by a philosopher, a 
triangle is a composed substance (compound of form and intelligible matter), whose 
primary substance (form) is abstracted (separated) in thought. 
 Aristotle’s assertion of the PNC takes place in Metaphysics Gamma, and not in the 
Posterior Analytics, since the PNC is an indemonstrable principle outside the scope of 
demonstrative knowledge. The Metaphysics does not introduce philosophical definitions 
in the form of deduced conclusions, meaning that primary substances (i.e. the 
definitions of composed substances) are independent of demonstrations. The 
philosophers provide definitions through intellection (nous), and the Posterior Analytics 
understands intellection as follows: “by intellection I mean a principle of knowledge 
(archên epistêmês)” (A, 33, 88b36). It is only through intellection that the PNC is 
cognized as a necessary principle in relation to the definition of being, qua being. 
Therefore, when the non-philosophers claim to search for proofs about the PNC, they 
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immediately show their ignorance by not being able to distinguish demonstrative 
knowledge from its indemonstrable principles. Metaphysics Gamma asserts:  
Some, due to their ignorance, also expect to demonstrate this [PNC]; for it is ignorance not to 
recognize for which things a demonstration must be searched, and for which things it must not 
be; for, in general, it is impossible that there is a demonstration of everything (for it would go 
on to infinity, so that there would not even be a demonstration), and if there are some principles 
for which a demonstration must not be searched, they cannot say which one they expect to be 
more a principle of that kind. (Metaphysics Gamma, 4, 1006a5-11) 
 
In the absence of indemonstrable principles, demonstrative knowledge would be 
impossible, since every premise would be the deduced conclusion of another 
demonstration, and so on. In other words, demonstrations would be ad infinitum, so that 
it would be impossible to reach some true, indemonstrable postulates. The impossibility 
to stop this infinite regress would prevent demonstrations from asserting knowledge. 
Only indemonstrable principles can provide demonstrative knowledge with some 
foundation. The Posterior Analytics (A, 3, 72b23-25) corroborates this view: “we say 
that there are not only [demonstrative] knowledge but also some [indemonstrable] 
principle of knowledge by which we cognize (gnôrizomen) the definitions”.12 Thus, any 
attempt to demonstrate the PNC would transform it into a deduced claim within 
demonstrative knowledge, so that the PNC could not be a principle of demonstrative 
knowledge anymore. This means that, through intellection, the philosophers have to 
cognize the PNC as a necessary condition for definition and demonstration. The absence 
of proof confirms that the PNC cannot belong to a particular science, and must thereby 
resort to a universal science prior to demonstrative knowledge. 
 
3. Two kinds of non-philosopher: the physicist and the dialectician 
 
To say that the PNC is the most certain opinion of all constitutes a weak claim, since 
every opinion is true by accident. Thus, Aristotle has to convince the non-philosophers 
that the PNC cannot be a false opinion. There are two ways of challenging the PNC: 
while some scientists may object to the use of the PNC for scientific reasons, some 
                                                 
12
 Aristotle adds: “We say that not all knowledge is demonstrative, but that which is about the 
immediates (amesôn) is indemonstrable (and that this is necessary is evident; for if it is 
necessary to know the things which are prior, i.e. from which we have the demonstration, and if 
it stops at some point with the immediates, it is necessary for these to be indemonstrable)” 
(Posterior Analytics A, 3, 72b18-22). 
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non-scientists will merely question the use of the PNC in spoken language. To these two 
distinct kinds of objection, Aristotle suggests two distinct kinds of reply: 
The method of discussion is not the same for all, since some require to be convinced, others to 
be defeated. If they have this opinion [against the PNC] as a result of perplexity (aporêsai) their 
mistake is easy to remedy, for the conflict is not with their discourse (logon) but with their 
thinking (dianoian). But if they state it for the sake of stating it, the remedy is a refutation 
(elenchos) of their account in the spoken sound (phônêi), i.e. in names (onomasin). 
(Metaphysics Gamma, 5, 1009a16-22) 
 
Some physicists may hold arguments, leading to the view that PNC is a false opinion. 
They will do so, if they restrict the nature of things to their motion, concluding that 
every thing is endlessly changing. Indeed, the PNC is irrelevant to things, whose 
ceaseless changing nature makes them indefinite. Aristotle has to find a satisfactory 
answer to this scientific objection. He must explain to these physicists how motion can 
be compatible with the PNC. Notice how Aristotle makes a distinction between 
discourse (logos) and thinking (dianoia), so that the objection from the physicists is 
based on a mental conception of meaning, independently of language. This shows that 
the mental contents in thoughts are not identified with the semantics of a given 
language.13 
The rejection of the PNC, when suggested by the physicists, is a direct challenge 
against philosophy as the first science, because if the PNC were threatened by motion, 
physics would have to be the first science, dealing with beings, qua movable beings. It 
would mean the irrelevance of philosophy, as the science of beings, qua beings. In fact, 
Aristotle acknowledges the privileged access of physics to the nature of things. As seen 
earlier, physics is said to be “some wisdom (sophia tis) but not primary”, unlike 
philosophy (Metaphysics Gamma, 3, 1005b1-2). The physicists understand the nature of 
things through change and motion, leading Aristotle to state in chapter 1 of Physics III: 
“since nature (phusis) is a principle of motion and change (archê kinêseôs kai 
metabolês), and since our enquiry is about nature, we should not ignore what motion is; 
for to ignore it is necessarily to ignore nature” (200b12-15). The investigation from the 
physicists does not go beyond motion and change, meaning that they do not define, 
unlike the philosophers, the primary substance of a physical thing, namely the 
what-being-is (to ti ên einai) for this thing. The primary substances are philosophical 
                                                 
13
 With respect to Aristotle, it is mistaken to talk about semantics as a theory of meaning. 
See Hudry (2011). 
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definitions, abstracted from the composed substances, whose motion and change are 
studied by the physicists.   
The physicists challenge the PNC, when they think of motion and change as 
exhausting the nature of things. If being is reduced to change, then the indefiniteness of 
being allows the same thing from having two contradictory predicates. In his reply, 
Aristotle targets the followers of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus, who 
identify the nature of things with changing perceptions, so that things are deemed to 
have indefinite substances (cf. Metaphysics Gamma, 5, 1009a27-30, b15-20). Aristotle 
urges these physicists to believe in a universal science, which defines things beyond 
physical phenomena, i.e. without motion and change: “we shall ask them to believe also 
that there is some other substance of beings (tôn ontôn) to which neither motion nor 
destruction nor generation of any kind belongs” (5, 1009a36-38). Aristotle appeals to 
the meta-physical nature (as primary substances) of things, distinct from their physical 
nature (as composed substances). In that respect, physics cannot be the first or universal 
science, and must be superseded by a prior science called philosophy. Despite their 
ignorance of philosophy, Aristotle tries to convince the physicists to accept primary 
substances: “they must be shown, and they must be convinced, that there is a certain 
nature without motion (akinêtos)” (5, 1010a33-35). In other words, physics depends 
upon another science of which the physicists have no knowledge, explaining why they 
have to believe in the philosophical PNC, without being able to assess its necessary 
truth. 
After having established that there is a higher science than physics, Aristotle must 
now explain how motion and change are compatible with the PNC. That is, the physical 
account of beings, qua movable beings, does not jeopardize the meta-physical definition 
of beings, qua beings. Aristotle uses the definition of motion from Physics III, in which 
motion is said to be “an entelechy of being in potentiality, qua potentiality” (tou 
dunamei ontos entelecheia, hêi toiouton) (1, 201a10-11). The distinction between 
potentiality and entelechy enables Aristotle to think of two simultaneous opposites, 
which are not in the same respect, meaning that the account of a thing in motion does 
not provide the physicists with an objection to the PNC: 
In response to those, whose opinion rests on these grounds [i.e. that opposites simultaneously 
are and are not], we shall say that in one sense they speak correctly, but in another sense they 
are ignorant; for being (to on) may be said in two ways, so that there is a way in which it is 
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possible for something to come from not-being (tou mê ontos), while in another way this is not 
possible, i.e. the same thing cannot simultaneously be both a being and a not-being (on kai mê 
on), unless it is not in the same respect; for it is possible for the opposites to be simultaneously 
the same thing in potentiality (dunamei), but not in entelechy (entelecheiai). (Metaphysics 
Gamma, 5, 1009a30-36) 
 
We can realize how motion threatens the PNC. For instance, an acorn comes from an 
oak tree, and an oak tree comes from an acorn, so that it is tempting to claim that an 
acorn is both an oak tree and not an oak tree. In other words, neither an oak tree nor an 
acorn seems to be a definite thing. Aristotle’s solution is to speak of a thing in two 
ways, as being either actual or potential. If we say that an acorn is both an oak tree and 
not an oak tree, we speak of something simultaneous but not in the same respect. While 
an acorn is an oak tree in potentiality, it is not an oak tree in entelechy. Philosophy, as 
the first science, tells us that the what-being-is (or primary substance) for an acorn is not 
the same as the what-being-is for an oak tree, so that each of these two things has a 
distinct, definite meta-physical nature. Change and motion preserve their respective 
beings, and thereby the PNC, because if an oak tree belongs to an acorn in potentiality 
(as an acorn is an oak tree potentially), it does not belong to it in entelechy (as an acorn 
is not an oak tree actually). These opposite predications are contraries, but not 
contradictories, since they are not in the same respect. Thus, it is true to say that an 
acorn is both an oak tree (in potentiality) and not an oak tree (in entelechy). It means 
that the physicists are right to believe in the truth of simultaneous opposites, owing to 
the nature of motion, but this does not imply the rejection of the PNC. No claims made 
by physics, as a particular science, go against philosophy, as a universal science. 
Aristotle draws a sharp distinction between the physicists and the ones who reject 
the PNC in discourse. While the former offer serious objections about the knowledge of 
actual things, the latter merely play with language, without involving (let alone 
threatening) inductive cognition (gnôsis) and deductive knowledge (epistêmê). Aristotle 
asserts: “what is found perplexing (aporoumenon) is not whether it is possible that the 
same should simultaneously be and not be a man in the name (onoma), but in the actual 
thing (pragma)” (Metaphysics Gamma, 4, 1006b20-22). As opposed to the physical 
objections that challenge the way in which the philosophers cognize actual things, the 
linguistic objections exclusively focus on meaningful spoken sounds. Aristotle speaks 
of “refutation (elenchos) of their account in the spoken sound, i.e. in names” 
(5, 1009a20-22). De Interpretatione identifies not only a name but also a sentence with 
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a “meaningful spoken sound” (phônê sêmantikê) (2, 16a19; 4, 16b26). Their meanings 
are arbitrary, as they depend upon linguistic conventions: “I say ‘by convention’ 
(kata sunthêkên) because no name is a name by nature (phusei) but only when it has 
become a symbol (sumbolon)” (2, 16a26-28).14 The Posterior Analytics (B, 7, 92b4-11) 
underlines the linguistic arbitrariness of names, when it claims that the name ‘goat-stag’ 
“means something” (sêmanei ti), despite the impossibility of cognizing an actual thing, 
i.e. a goat-stag. This explains why Aristotle does not worry about the linguistic 
objections formulated by the dialecticians and the sophists. Dialectic and sophistic are 
very different from either philosophy or physics, as they are neither universal nor 
particular sciences. Metaphysics Gamma (cf. 2, 1004b17-26) claims that philosophy 
“cognizes” (gnôristikê), dialectic “questions” (peirastikê), and sophistic “appears” 
(phainomenê) to cognize but does not do so. The difference between dialectic and 
sophistic is that, while the former challenges philosophy, the latter imitates philosophy. 
There is something dishonest in sophistic, which aims to fake philosophy, as opposed to 
dialectic, genuinely criticizing philosophical cognition. Regardless of this difference, 
both fail to produce serious objections to scientific arguments (whether they are 
philosophical, physical, or mathematical), since their expressed opinions cannot account 
for scientific principles.  
 Aristotle’s linguistic solution to the dialectical or sophistical objection to the PNC 
discards the possibility of a direct proof, since a demonstration simpliciter rests on a 
petitio principii. In contrast, he suggests an indirect proof, called refutation (elenchos): 
I say that demonstrating by refutation (elenktikôs apodeixai) and demonstrating are different, 
because in a demonstration one might be thought to beg the point at issue (aiteisthai to en 
archêi), but if someone else (allou) is responsible for such a thing, there will be refutation 
(elenchos) and not demonstration. (Metaphysics Gamma, 4, 1006a15-18) 
 
If Aristotle wanted to resort to a demonstration simpliciter in order to justify the use of 
the PNC in spoken language, he would have had no other choice but to assume the PNC 
in the premises of his demonstration, meaning that the exact thing to prove would 
                                                 
14
 Aristotle holds the same view regarding sentences: “Every sentence is meaningful, not as a 
tool but, as we have said, by convention” (De Interpretatione, 4, 16b33-17a2). The expression 
‘not as a tool’ (ouch hôs organon) is a direct criticism of Plato’s position, which views names 
and sentences as ontological tools, mirroring the nature of things they signify (cf. Cratylus, 
388b-c, 389d-390a). About Aristotle’s notion of linguistic convention, see Kretzmann (1974). 
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already have been granted in the premises. It would have been a circular argument or 
petitio principii, namely a fallacy. Let us imagine the following dialogue: 
— I want to prove the use of the PNC in spoken language.  
— Do you mean that the denial of your affirmation is false?  
— Yes, since I do not want to contradict myself. 
— So, you already assume the use of the PNC in the premises of your proof, 
meaning that you are begging the point at issue. 
The direct proof (or demonstration simpliciter) of the PNC is a petitio principii of the 
form: ‘we prove the use of the PNC in language by using the PNC in the premises of 
our proof’. The circularity of the argument implies its failure.15  
Aristotle avoids the circularity of the direct proof by resorting to an indirect proof, 
called refutation. It is a matter of reversing the burden of proof by showing that it is 
impossible to justify the absence of the PNC in spoken language. That is why Aristotle 
says that “someone else” (allou) is made responsible for the petitio principii (cf. above), 
meaning that the dialecticians or the sophists, who happen to be against the use of the 
PNC in language, will nevertheless assume the PNC in any of their statements. We can 
illustrate Aristotle’s refutation as follows: 
— Do you believe in the use of the PNC in spoken language?   
— No, I do not believe in the PNC.  
— Do you mean that the denial of your affirmation is true? 
— No, I do not want to say that I believe in the PNC. 
— So, you already assume the use of the PNC, when you claim that you do not 
believe in the PNC. 
                                                 
15
 The Prior Analytics (B, 16, 64b28-30, b34-38) explains why to beg the point at issue leads to 
an argumentative failure: “To beg and to assume the point at issue (to d’ en archêi aiteisthai kai 
lambanein) is a kind of failure to demonstrate what is suggested… Since some things are 
naturally known through themselves, and other things by means of something else (for 
the principles are known through themselves, but what are below the principles are known 
through something else), and whenever someone tries to prove through itself that which is not 
known through itself, he then begs the point at issue (tot’ aiteitai to ex archês).” Aristotle 
suggests an instance of petitio principii with the impossibility of proving the geometric axiom 
of parallels: “This is just what those people do, who suppose that they draw proofs that there are 
parallels; for they fail to notice that they themselves assume what is not possible to demonstrate 
if there are no parallels. Hence, it turns out that those who deduce in this way are saying that 
each thing is so, if each thing is so; but in this way everything would be known through itself; 
and this is impossible.” (Prior Analytics B, 16, 65a4-9; cf. also Euclid’s Elements). 
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Aristotle’s strategy is to force the dialecticians or the sophists, who are against the PNC 
in language, to beg the point at issue, and thereby to assume the PNC.16 Their fallacious 
argument is of the form: ‘we reject the use of the PNC by using the PNC’. Aristotle can 
then conclude to the impossibility of denying the use of the PNC in spoken language. 
This refutation does not directly prove that the opinion about the PNC is true. It 
merely transfers the burden of proof from Aristotle to the PNC-opponent. Here is how 
Aristotle explains his strategy: 
The starting-point of all these argumentations is not to ask that we state something either to be 
or not to be (for that might well be believed to beg the point at issue (to ex archês aitein)), but at 
least that we mean something to both ourselves and someone else; for this is necessary, if we 
really say anything. For if we do not, there would be no discourse (logos) in response to either 
ourselves or anyone else. But if we grant this, there will be demonstration [in the manner of 
refuting]; for there will already be something definite (hôrismenon). Yet, the responsible for this 
is not the one who demonstrates [in the manner of refuting] but the one who upholds; for he 
upholds a discourse, while suppressing a discourse (anairôn gar logon hupomenei logon). As 
yet, anyone who agrees with this has agreed that something is true without demonstration 
[simpliciter], so that it is not true that everything will be so and not so. (Metaphysics Gamma, 4, 
1006a18-28) 
Aristotle examines the different conditions for the refutation to take place.17 First, no 
direct proof of the PNC is possible, since it would only beg the point at issue. Second, 
the one who wants to defend the PNC has to say something meaningful, so that a 
discussion with the PNC-opponent becomes possible. Third, the transfer of the burden 
of proof happens when the PNC-opponent makes a claim. The key moment is expressed 
                                                 
 
16
 Aristotle’s method of refutation is close to Plato’s in his early dialogues. In the Meno, 
Socrates refutes the slave boy’s false opinion by making him admit new premises, without 
warning him explicitly that to accept these new premises will lead him to reject his initial 
opinion. Cf. Vlastos (1999). 
17
 Aristotle asserts the exact same point in Metaphysics Kappa: “There is a principle in 
substances about which we cannot be mistaken, and about which it is always necessary to 
produce what is contrary, and I mean by this to say the truth, i.e. that it is not possible for a 
same thing to be and not to be in relation to one and the same time, and likewise for any other 
similar opposites. About these matters there is no demonstration simpliciter (haplôs), but one in 
relation to a person [who rejects PNC]; for we cannot produce a deduction from this most 
certain principle, but this should be so if there were to be a demonstration simpliciter. Against 
the one who speaks of opposite assertions, if we want to prove why it is false, we have to make 
him assume something which will be the same as the view that it is not possible for a same thing 
to be and not to be in relation to one and the same time, but such that it will not seem to him to 
be the same; for this will be the only possible demonstration against someone who claims that 
opposite assertions can be truly made about the same thing.” (5, 1061b34-1062a11). Some 
doubt the authenticity of Book Kappa. Since the views about the PNC in Kappa are in 
agreement with the ones in Gamma, we shall leave this historical question unanswered. 
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as follows (cf. above): “he upholds a discourse, while suppressing a discourse”. This 
means that, as soon as the PNC-opponents make a statement, they immediately destroy 
it by assuming the truth of its contradictory denial. In other words, the only way to 
avoid destruction is to assume the PNC as a true opinion, such that it is false to 
contradict every affirmation by its denial. Aristotle concludes (cf. above): “anyone who 
agrees with this has agreed that something is true without demonstration [simpliciter]”. 
That is, the PNC-opponents have no other choice but to believe in the truth of the PNC, 
and they do so implicitly, without requiring any proofs that this opinion is true.  
Aristotle’s refutation is an indirect proof, which only shows that it is wrong not to 
believe in the PNC. If the PNC-opponents decide to stay silent, no refutation takes 
place, because no wrong opinion is there to be refuted. Indeed, their silence prevents the 
burden of proof from being transferred to them:  
We can demonstrate by refutation (apodeixai elenktikôs) that even this view [against the PNC] 
is impossible, if only the disputant says something. If he says nothing, it is absurd to search for a 
discourse (logon) in response to the one who holds a discourse about nothing, in so far as he 
holds no discourse; for such a person, in so far as he is such, is similar to a plant (phutôi). 
(Metaphysics Gamma, 4, 1006a11-15) 
 
The refutation rests on the meaningful assertions made by the PNC-opponents. In the 
absence of assertions, their implicit acceptance of the PNC cannot be established. 
Aristotle compares these silent PNC-opponents to plants, which are living beings 
without voice (unlike animals). Accordingly, there is no refutation, if there is no 
sentence (logos), namely no meaningful spoken sound. More precisely, the sentence has 
to be declarative (apophantikos), meaning that it has to be either true or false.18 
Furthermore, since a refutation depends upon a sentence expressed by some individual, 
its scope is confined to an individual opinion held against the PNC. We may then 
understand such a refutation as an argument ad hominem (to the person). This is not a 
fallacy, but a weak argument, which only takes place in a dialectical context 
(discussion), and cannot be generalized to every opinion held against the PNC.  
                                                 
18
 De Interpretatione (4, 17a2-7) states: “Not every sentence is declarative (apophantikos), but 
only those to which truth or falsehood belongs. We cannot say it about all sentences: a prayer is 
a sentence but is neither true nor false. Let us leave aside all the other sentences (since 
consideration of them rather belongs to the domain of rhetoric or poetry). Only the declarative 
sentence belongs to the present study.” 
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Aristotle is aware that his defense of the PNC requires a dialectical context. That is 
why he speaks of dialectical difficulties, when he asserts the PNC: “For it is impossible 
for the same thing to belong and not to belong simultaneously to the same thing and in 
the same respect (and regarding all the other specifications that might be added, they 
have to be added against the dialectical difficulties (pros tas logikas duschereias))” 
(Metaphysics Gamma, 3, 1005b19-22). Dialectic is unrelated to the necessary truth of 
the PNC, as scientifically investigated by philosophy, but concerns the common opinion 
held by the non-philosophers. Aristotle has to discuss with the dialecticians and the 
sophists in order to refute their opinion against the use of the PNC in language. He also 
has to convince the physicists to use the PNC in the study of actual things, and a 
dialectical context is also required, since the physicists have no scientific cognition of 
philosophy. Nevertheless, the dialectical method of refutation is irrelevant in the case of 
the physicists, since their criticism of the PNC is not based on language.19 In that 
respect, the physicists are dialecticians with respect to philosophy, but are not so with 
respect to their own science.  
 
4. Principle vs. opinion 
 
The distinction between philosophers and non-philosophers is the best way to explain 
why the PNC is true both as a necessary principle (with respect to the philosophers) and 
as a common opinion (with respect to the non-philosophers). If we disregard this 
contrast, we cannot understand why Aristotle takes so much care in his defense of the 
PNC as a true opinion, while he first introduces it as the most certain principle of all. 
Łukasiewicz is unable to resolve this apparent dilemma, and eventually concludes about 
Aristotle: “he may himself have felt the weakness of his arguments; and that may have 
                                                 
19
 Hamlyn (1990, 469) stresses the role of dialectic: “The argument which Aristotle uses in 
Metaphysics IV to refute those who dispute the Principle of Non-Contradiction, considered as a 
metaphysical principle about ‘what is’, is generally and quite rightly regarded as the example 
par excellence of Aristotelian dialectic used with a serious purpose. It might be characterized as 
presenting the sceptic with a dilemma: either he speaks or he does not; if he does he must 
presuppose the principle; if he does not he cannot deny it; so he must accept it.” Notice that the 
skeptic here is the dialectician or the sophist, i.e. the one who challenges the use of the PNC in 
spoken language (as opposed to the physicist who challenges the use of the PNC in actual 
things). For the role of dialectic in relation to the PNC, see also Irwin (1977) and Lear (1980). 
In contrast, some ignore the role of dialectic, e.g. Wedin (2004ab). 
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led him to present his Law as an ultimate axiom—an unassailable dogma” (1979, p. 62, 
original emphases). Others have used Aristotle’s weak justifications as a way to 
illustrate the failure of the PNC as a logical principle.20 Such interpretations, or rather 
reconstructions, ignore the context in which the PNC is asserted, in so far as the PNC is 
said to be a principle belonging to philosophy, as the first science, namely a universal 
science whose scope is beyond all the particular sciences. The PNC, as a necessarily 
true principle, is unrelated to dialectical difficulties, since the philosophers have directly 
access to this principle. For anyone else, a dialectical context is required, in which 
Aristotle tries either to convince the physicists of the use of the PNC in actual things or 
to refute the dialecticians and the sophists in their rejection of the PNC in spoken 
language.  
Consequently, when Aristotle reaches his conclusion at the end of chapter 6 of 
Metaphysics Gamma, he identifies the PNC with the most certain opinion of all, and his 
claim is exclusively addressed to the non-philosophers (and in particular to the 
physicists): 
Hence, enough has been said about the most certain opinion (doxa) of all that opposite 
assertions are not true simultaneously, and about what follows from some who say that they are 
[true simultaneously], and about why some say this; since it is impossible for contradictories to 
be simultaneously true in relation to the same thing, it is evident that it is also not possible for 
opposites to belong to the same thing simultaneously; for, regarding opposites, one of the two is 
no less a privation (sterêsis), i.e. the privation of a substance; and privation is the denial 
(apophasis) of a definite genus; hence, if it is impossible to affirm and to deny simultaneously 
and truly, it is also impossible for opposites to belong simultaneously, unless either both belong 
in some way or one belongs in some way and the other belongs simpliciter (haplôs). 
(Metaphysics Gamma, 6, 1011b13-22) 
 
The PNC, as the most certain opinion of all, implies that two contradictory assertions 
about the same thing cannot be simultaneously true: if an affirmation is true, its denial 
must be false, and conversely. Likewise, an affirmation and its denial cannot belong to 
the same thing: while an affirmation describes an actual thing (i.e. a composed 
                                                 
20
 For instance, Priest (2006, 2) writes: “The only major defence of the “Law of 
Non-Contradiction”—and so the only major critique of dialetheism—in the history of Western 
philosophy was given by Aristotle in book Γ of the Metaphysics. The defence is highly 
problematic. It is not clear what, exactly, his arguments are meant to establish, or how, exactly, 
they are meant to establish it… As we will see, none of the arguments in question succeeds in 
discrediting dialetheism.” Dialetheism asserts the truth of some contradictions. This is not the 
same as paraconsistency, which rejects the ex falso quodlibet of classical logic, i.e. the claim 
that, from two contradictory premises, anything follows. Cf. Priest (1998). 
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substance), its denial will account for the privation of this thing. Following Aristotle, 
privation (sterêsis) amounts to the denial of a definite genus. For instance, the true 
affirmation ‘man is a terrestrial, two-footed animal’ stands for the thought of an actual 
man, such that the definite genus ‘animal’ includes its differentiae ‘terrestrial’ and 
‘two-footed’. On the other hand, the false denial ‘man is not a terrestrial, two-footed 
animal’ (i.e. ‘it is not the case that man is a terrestrial, two-footed animal’) stands for a 
privative thought, namely the denial of the definite genus ‘animal’ in relation to 
‘terrestrial’ and ‘two-footed’. Therefore, if an affirmation pertains to an actual thing, its 
denial has to pertain to something other than this actual thing. The end of the above 
passage underlines how two opposite assertions may be simultaneously true, providing 
they are not in the same respect. We have seen that the affirmation ‘an acorn is an oak 
tree’ and its denial ‘an acorn is not an oak tree’ are simultaneously true, since they are 
not exact opposites: the oak tree belongs to an acorn in potentiality, while it does not 
belong to it in actuality. These opposite assertions are contraries, without being 
contradictories. 
 When Łukasiewicz asserts the logical formulation of the PNC, he quotes the first 
sentence of the above passage. As seen earlier, he writes: “Logical formulation: ‘The 
most certain of all [principles] is that contradictory sentences are not true at the same 
time’ (Meta. IV 6, 1011b13-14)”. Whereas Aristotle speaks of the PNC as the most 
certain opinion (doxa), Łukasiewicz reinterprets it as the most certain principle (archê). 
He neglects Aristotle’s claim that only philosophy, as the first science, understands the 
PNC as a necessary principle, meaning that the non-philosophers believe in this 
principle, without being able to cognize its necessity. From their standpoint, the PNC 
remains a common opinion, and Aristotle has to convince them that this opinion is true 
by providing the right justifications for it. Yet, the only way to understand the necessary 
truth of the PNC would be to become a philosopher. Therefore, to speak of the PNC 
through distinct formulations, as the followers of Łukasiewicz continue to do so, does 
not enable one to realize that Aristotle’s main concern lies in the defense of the 
philosophical PNC for those who have no access to philosophy.  
 
 
Jean-Louis Hudry 
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